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1 
LECTURE 
ST. THOMAS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
FALL 2012 DISTINGUISHED SPEAKER SERIES 
WHAT MUST WE HIDE: THE ETHICS OF 
PRIVACY AND THE ETHOS OF DISCLOSURE 
ANITA L. ALLEN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
We live in an era of personal revelation. We are preoccupied by 
seeking, gathering, and disclosing information about others and ourselves.  
In the age of revelation, individuals and enterprises are fond of ferreting out 
what is buried away.  We are fond of broadcasting what we know, think, 
do, and feel; and we are motivated by business and pleasure because we 
care about friendship, kinship, health, wealth, education, politics, justice, 
and culture.  A lot of this has to do with technology, of course.  We live at a 
historical moment characterized by the wide availability of multiple modes 
of communication and stored data, easily and frequently accessed.  Our 
communications are capable of disclosing breadths and depths of personal, 
personally identifiable, and sensitive information to many people rapidly.  
In this era of revelation—dominated by portable electronics, internet social 
media, reality television, and traditional talk radio—many of us are losing 
our sense of privacy, our taste for privacy, and our willingness to respect 
privacy.  Is this set of losses a bad thing?  If it is a bad thing, what can be 
done about it? 
My reflections on these questions begin with a series of diverse  
examples from the past several years.  The examples illustrate the emergent 
ethos of our revelatory era.  The first and second examples portray 
voluntary self-revelation for amusement and monetary gain; a third and 
fourth example depict revelations concerning others, motivated by a desire 
for amusement in one case and geopolitical justice in another. 
Former Congressman Anthony Weiner was a Democratic member of 
the United States House of Representatives elected by the people of New 
 
* Anita L. Allen, J.D., Ph.D., is the Henry R. Silverman Professor of Law and Professor of 
Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania.  This lecture reflects her recent work, including her 
book Unpopular Privacy, What Must We Hide. 
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York.1  Congressman Weiner sent sexually suggestive images of himself as 
attachments to Twitter messages to young women, ages twenty-one and 
seventeen, he did not even know.2  When knowledge of his “sexting” 
conduct became public in 2011, he was forced to resign from office under 
pressure from fellow Democrats.  There was no obvious, objectively urgent 
need for Congressman Weiner’s messages.  We have to assume he was 
simply amusing himself  in an especially risky and presumptuous manner.  
He cared little for the privacy of his body and sexual urges, so little that he 
risked the grave consequences of their exposure to strangers whom he had 
no reason to trust.3 
When Joyce Maynard was only eighteen years old, she had an 
intimate affair with famed writer J. D. Salinger.  He was fifty-three years 
old.  For a short while, the mismatched lovers lived together in his New 
Hampshire hideaway where his fame and genius seduced her.  In 2006, 
Maynard announced she would sell the fourteen unpublished love letters 
that the reclusive Salinger wrote to her between April 25, 1972, and August 
17, 1973.  Sotheby’s auction house agreed to manage the sale.  Maynard 
knew how greatly Salinger valued his privacy and that he would be 
offended by her decision; but, she said that the letters were her property 
and, moreover, that she needed money to send her children to college.  Her 
own privacy no longer mattered to her since she had already published At 
Home in the World, a memoir of the fascinating, scandalous affair.4  Was it 
ethical for Maynard to exploit the law and further offend and embarrass a 
former lover for profit?  It is not self-evident that ethics allow a person in 
Maynard’s position this particular freedom. 
My next example, like the Congressman Weiner example, involves 
 
 1. Jennifer Preston, Weiner Says He Sent Private Messages to Girl, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 
2011, at A17, available at 2011 WLNR 11683951. 
 2. Id.; Ashley Parker & Michael Barbaro, Rep. Weiner’s Pattern: Political Admirers 
Became Online Pursuits, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2011, at A7, available at 2011 WLNR 11725834. 
 3. Michael  Barbaro  &  Ashley  Parker,  A  Pattern  of  Making  Politics  Personal  Several 
Online  Admirers  Describe  Questionable  Advances  by  Lawmaker,  INT’L  HERALD  TRIB.,  
June 10, 2011,  at  5,  available  at  2011  WLNR  11516714; Brian Stelter, Upending  
Anonymity,  These  Days  the Web Unmasks Everyone,  
N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/us/21anonymity.html. 
 4. JOYCE MAYNARD, AT HOME IN THE WORLD (1999).  On a webpage devoted to her book, 
Maynard writes: 
For more than four decades I had lived with a deep and abiding need to please others. 
Since the age of eighteen, I had been haunted by the fear of J. D. Salinger’s 
disapproval and wrath. And I wasn’t wrong that my decision to break a long-held 
silence concerning a literary icon’s role in my life would bring terrible wrath and 
disapproval upon me. 
Joyce Maynard, At Home in the World, http://www.joycemaynard.com/Joyce_Maynard/ 
B__At_Home_in_the_World.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2012). 
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contemporary communications technologies.  In 2010, a talented young 
musician named Tyler Clementi was a freshman at Rutgers University, the 
state university of New Jersey.  He asked his roommate, Dharun Ravi, to 
let him have their room for the night for a date.  Ravi consented, but 
decided to pull a prank on Clementi.  He switched on a webcam in their 
dormitory room, webcasting Clementi’s same-sex intimacies all over the 
Internet.  When Clementi learned what had been done to him, the 
distraught, gay youth bid farewell to his friends online and then committed 
suicide.  On September 22, 2010, the teenager leapt to his death off of New 
York City’s George Washington Bridge.  In my view, the ethics of 
Congressman Weiner’s and  Joyce Maynard’s revelations are somewhat 
debatable, but the ethics of Ravi’s are not.  Ravi’s thoughtless advantage 
taking was unethical; and, as moral luck would have it, it also had a 
devastating outcome compounding the sense of its wrongfulness.  Ravi was 
convicted of the New Jersey crimes of “bias intimidation” and criminal 
privacy invasion.5 
My final example is WikiLeaks.  WikiLeaks describes itself as “a 
non-profit media organization dedicated to bringing important news and 
information to the public.”  It does this by providing a “secure and 
anonymous way for independent sources around the world to leak 
information to its journalists.”6  While a member of the United States 
armed forces on active duty, then twenty-two year old Private Bradley 
Manning provided WikiLeaks with sensitive United States Government 
documents without authority, including field reports from wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, classified State Department diplomatic cables, records 
concerning Guantanamo Bay detainees, and videos of United States 
military missions.7  Manning was arrested in 2010 and tried in 2011.8  The 
sensitive documents he handed over to Wikileaks were published by 
WikiLeaks and then republished by major mainstream media and social 
media alike.  Many people were appalled that such a thing could occur.  
But strikingly, many were not appalled either because they failed to 
recognize any legitimate expectations of privacy, confidentiality or 
 
 5. Kate Zernike, Jury Finds Spying in Rutgers Dorm Was a Hate Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/yregion/defendant-guilty-in-rutgers-
case.html?pagewanted=all; see also N.J. STAT. § 2C:16-1 (2008) (criminalizing bias intimidation 
based upon a person’s sexual orientation); N.J. STAT. § 2C:14-9(c) (2004). 
 6. Main, WIKILEAKS.FDN (last visited Oct. 9, 2012), http://wikileaks.fdn.fr. 
 7. Charlie Savage, Private Accused of Leaks Offers Partial Guilty Plea, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/us/army-private-in-wikileaks-case-offers-partial-
guilty-plea.html. 
 8. David Dishneau, U.S. Army private offers lesser plea in WikiLeaks case, OKLAHOMAN, 
Nov. 12, 2012, at 8A, available at 2012 WLNR 24084251. 
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security, or because they believed the social good of disclosure far 
outweighed any embarrassment to diplomats and nations. 
What is the social good at issue?  According to WikiLeaks, it 
publishes “material of ethical, political and historical significance while 
keeping the identity of [its] sources anonymous, thus providing a universal 
way for the revealing of suppressed and censored injustices.”9  Julian 
Assange defends his group’s approach to forced government 
accountability—“shining the light on the secret crimes of the powerful.”10  
Some link the “Arab Spring” pro-democracy movements afoot in North 
Africa to distrust and disgust fueled by WikiLeaks.11  Nonetheless, some 
professors of foreign relations initially said they would not incorporate 
information revealed by WikiLeaks into their university courses because it 
was acquired and published unethically. 
In the age of revelation, sensitive information will come to light 
whether it ought to or not.  Whether it is our love lives or political 
strategies, all will come to light.  For better or worse, everything from 
furtive street crimes to genomes will come to light.12 
II. THE VALUE OF PRIVACY 
The four examples with which I began raise concerns about the value 
of privacy.  They show that some people especially do not value their own 
privacy, and some do not value the privacy of others.  Philosophically, 
these examples say something about the positive ethics of informational 
privacy.13  By informational privacy, I mean conditions of limited access to 
and limited disclosure of personal data.  In situations in which people 
actually want privacy protected, allowing individuals to control personal 
information about themselves has been an important way to achieve desired 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Charlie Osborne & Zack Whittaker, Assange: U.S. ‘witch hunt’ against Wikileaks must 
end, ZDNET.COM (Aug. 19, 2012), http://www.zdnet.com/assange-u-s-witch-hunt-against-
wikileaks-must-end-7000002832; Julian Assange, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/ 
op/reference/timestopics/people/a/julian_p_assange/index.html (last updated Aug. 19, 2012). 
 11. State Department Press Releases & Documents, Internet Freedom: Promoting Human 
Rights in the Digital Age - A Panel Discussion, FED. INFO. & NEWS DISPATCH, INC., May 3, 
2011, available at 2011 WLNR 8610506. 
 12. Cf. PRIVACY AND PROGRESS IN WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING, REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES 27 (2012), available at 
http://www.bioethics.gov/cms/sites/default/files/PrivacyProgress508.pdf. 
 13. See infra Part II.  In addition to informational privacy, we commonly speak of physical 
privacy (e.g., rights to seclusion at home, bodily integrity); decisional privacy (e.g., abortion 
rights, right to die, right to marry); proprietary privacy (e.g., celebrity rights in voice, name, and 
likeness); associational privacy (e.g., exclusive club membership); and intellectual privacy (e.g., 
freedom to think about, read about and discuss ideas).  Id. 
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forms of limited access.  A discussion of the ethics of informational privacy 
would be expected to address questions about when to restrict publication 
of intimate facts and when to require confidentiality.14  Most of the 
foundational work on the ethics of privacy in the United States has been 
produced since the 1960s when scholars began to worry about the impact 
of computing and data banking.15 
A good deal of the early work elevates privacy to the status of one of 
the great values of enlightened civilization.  However, some of the 
technology theorists who write about privacy today are dismissive of 
privacy.  They find it annoying and that it has irrelevant value.  They see it 
as a dead, unwanted value about as useful and interesting as our great 
grandmothers’ yellowed linens.  An Internet policy colleague of mine at the 
University of Pennsylvania bemoans that conversations about Internet 
policy always seem to “devolve” into discussions of privacy.  Yet, the 
overwhelming majority of academic philosophers who write about privacy, 
myself included, write in praise of it.16  I caution against privacy perils and 
excesses, but make the case for its perpetuation in my work.17 
So what can be said in favor of privacy and its protection?  Let me list 
the values, good, and ends that I, and other like-minded scholars, relate to 
privacy:18 
• Self-expression: Opportunities for privacy allow individuals 
to better express their true personalities and values. 
• Good Reputation: Privacy helps preserve reputations. 
• Repose: Privacy may enable tranquility and relaxation. 
 
 14. See generally ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE 3 (2011) 
(discussing a case in which doctor-patient confidentiality was breached when a physician 
petitioned the state to unseal his patient’s adoption records). 
 15. See Anita L. Allen, Privacy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL ETHICS (2005). 
 16. See, e.g., JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE 
RISE OF TECHNOLOGY (1997) (looking at the development of privacy in the United States over 
the last century and how concepts of privacy have played a fundamental role in a broad range of 
studies); ANNABELLE LEVER, ON PRIVACY (2012) (discussing how privacy enables individuals to 
shut the world out and that the way in which privacy is protected is fundamentally a public 
matter); ADAM D. MOORE, PRIVACY RIGHTS: MORAL AND LEGAL FOUNDATIONS (2010) 
(discussing individuals’ rights to control access to their own bodies, specific places, and personal 
information); BEATE ROSSLER, THE VALUE OF PRIVACY (2005) (expressing the view that privacy 
is worth protecting and should be normatively respected and analyzing why individuals value 
privacy). 
 17. See, e.g., ANITA L. ALLEN, WHY PRIVACY ISN’T EVERYTHING (2003) (discussing how, 
why, and to whom indiviudals are accountable for their personal lives and stressing that 
individuals have varieties of accountability and a variety of people to whom they are expected to 
answer). 
 18. See ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW AND SOCIETY 7–9 (2007). 
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• Intellectual Life: Privacy may enhance creativity and 
reflection, which may be good for an individual’s own sake, 
but which can lead to useful cultural products and inventions. 
• Intimacy and Formality: Opportunities for privacy are 
thought to enable individuals to keep some people at a 
distance, so that they can enjoy intense intimate relationships 
with others. 
• Preferences and Traditions: Privacy allows the individual or 
groups of like-minded individuals the ability to plan 
undertakings and live in accord with preferences and 
traditions. 
• Civility: Privacy norms sustain civility by condemning 
behaviors that offend courtesy, honor, and appropriateness. 
• Human Dignity: Philosophers have said that respect for 
privacy is, in many ways, respect for human dignity itself. 
• Limited Government: Privacy rights against government 
demand that state power is limited and unobtrusive, as liberal 
democracy requires. 
• Toleration: Privacy rights demand that government tolerate 
differences among individuals and groups. 
• Autonomy: An aspect of liberty, privacy fosters the 
development and exercise of autonomy. 
• Individualism: Privacy fosters individualism, and it is not 
fairly condemned as a purely individualistic value at odds 
with ideals of a cooperative, efficient democratic community. 
Anyone who makes the case for privacy must contend with the case 
against it and against the rights protecting it.  Indeed, not all philosophers 
emphasize the good of privacy.  A few have emphasized values, good, and 
ends that properly limit personal privacy: 
• National Security: Privacy interferes with national security 
measures. 
• Law Enforcement: Privacy interferes with effective and 
efficient law enforcement. 
• Public Health: Privacy hampers effective and efficient public 
health protection, e.g., it burdens the delivery of routine 
medical care and heath research. 
• Public Right to Know: Privacy rights chill free speech and a 
free press.  Privacy keeps information the public has a right to 
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know in private or government hands. 
• Administrative Costs: Privacy rights enable individuals to 
bring trivial lawsuits involving little more than hurt feelings 
to court, thereby taking up time judges could devote to more 
serious personal injury cases. 
• Selfish Individualism: Privacy is unduly individualistic. 
• Inefficiency: Privacy protection practices are inefficient for 
business. 
• Excess of Protections: The United States has too many 
privacy laws.  Privacy rights can keep socially valuable 
information out of the hands of people who could use and 
learn from it. 
• Privacy Rights Should be Limited: The law should provide a 
remedy only against intrusions and publications that are 
“highly offensive.”  The law should protect only “reasonable 
expectations of privacy” and bar state interference only if it is 
wholly irrational or “unduly burdensome.” 
III. THE LURE OF FREE SPEECH 
Why not reveal?  Why not disclose?  Why hide anything?  Courts 
have been asked to support ideals of anonymous Internet speech that would 
allow bold, even cruel, speech to reign free and immunize speakers from 
exposure and even liability.  In a high-profile federal district court case 
from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, Doe I 
and Doe II v. Individuals, whose true names are unknown,19 the plaintiffs 
were two female students at Yale Law School.  The two students were 
targets of defamatory, threatening, and harassing statements posted on 
AutoAdmit.com from 2005 to 2007. 
AutoAdmit is an Internet discussion board that, in the mid-2000s, 
drew between 800,000 and one million visitors per month.  Participants 
posted and reviewed comments about universities and law schools.  A 
photograph of one of the plaintiffs was published on AutoAdmit without 
her permission.  An anonymous commentator encouraged others to “[r]ate 
this HUGE breasted cheerful big tit girl from YLS.”  In two months, nearly 
two hundred threads about the women were posted.  One post stated that 
 
 19. Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 (D. Conn. 2008); see also Anita L. Allen, 
Symposium: Privacy Jurisprudence as an Instrument of Social Change First Amendment Privacy 
and the Battle for Progressively Liberal Social Change, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 885, 913 (2012) 
(discussing the Individuals case). 
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plaintiff fantasized about being raped by her father, that she enjoyed having 
sex while family members watched, that she encouraged others to punch 
her in the stomach while seven months pregnant, that she had a sexually 
transmitted disease, that she had abused heroin, and a poster said that she 
“hope[s] she gets raped and dies.”20 
After plaintiffs filed a lawsuit, many posts were published discussing 
the lawsuit.  The Yale women brought federal copyright claims and state 
law claims for libel, invasion of privacy, and emotional distress against 
unknown individuals using thirty-nine different pseudonymous names.  In 
the course of the suit, and here is where the free speech issues arise, the 
plaintiffs issued a subpoena duces tecum to Internet service provider AT&T 
for information relating to the identity of the person assigned to the Internet 
Protocol (“IP”) address from which an individual posted comments about 
one of the plaintiffs.  AT&T sent a letter to the person whose Internet 
account corresponded with the IP address, and he filed a motion to quash 
disclosure of his identity and a motion to proceed anonymously in the suit. 
The court held the plaintiffs were entitled to disclosure of the poster’s 
identity.  The court stated that the protection afforded anonymous speech 
by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution extends to 
speech on the Internet, as cyberlibertarians prefer to think, but that this 
right is not absolute and does not protect speech that otherwise would be 
unprotected.  Libel is not protected speech.  The plaintiffs established a 
prima facie case of libel against the poster through evidence tending to 
show that the poster’s discussion of her alleged sexual behavior in a 
message that clearly identified her by name harmed her reputation. 
As for the allegation that he should be able to proceed anonymously 
as “John Doe” out of regard for his free speech rights and reputation, the 
court also held against the poster.  The rule of procedure requiring parties 
to a lawsuit to identify themselves protects the public’s legitimate interest 
in knowing all of the facts involved, including the identities of the parties.  
The risk that an Internet user might be exposed to ridicule or lose 
employment upon disclosure of his identity was not grounds to allow him 
to proceed anonymously. 
The lawsuit settled out of court.21  I believe the district court came to 
 
 20. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 251. 
 21. Yale Online Slur Lawsuit Settled, NEWSTIMES.COM (Oct. 22, 2009), 
http://www.newstimes.com/news/article/Yale-online-slur-lawsuit-settled-185825.php. 
A lawyer for two former Yale University law students says they have settled their 
lawsuit against several people they accused of posting sexually harassing and 
threatening messages about them on an Internet site.  San Francisco attorney Ashok 
Ramani told the Hartford Courant on Wednesday that the two women settled with “a 
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the right decision with respect to both issues—forcing AT&T to hand over 
the name of the person behind the IP address of the AutoAdmit poster and 
forcing the poster to litigate under his real name.  Free speech ideals should 
not give persons carte blanche to defame others and invade their privacy.  
But in the age of revelation, we not only have to concern ourselves with 
free speech being used to justify disclosures about others, but we also need 
to concern ourselves with free speech seeming to give persons carte 
blanche to make disclosures about themselves. 
IV. VOLUNTARY SELF-DISCLOSURE 
One has to be especially intrigued by the voluntary self-disclosure 
that characterizes our era, which is why I began with the Congressman 
Weiner incident and the Maynard-Salinger affair.  Congressman Weiner 
exposed himself.  Maynard exposed Salinger, but after she had made an 
industry of exposing herself.  We make disclosures about ourselves and do 
not imagine anyone having ethical grounds to object to our doing so.  Fun, 
popular social media, like Facebook and Twitter, make personal disclosures 
easy and nearly irresistible.  Is there an ethics problem with self-disclosure?  
Is there any reason to be reserved, private, secret, or contained offline? 
Television programs are one semi-authentic personally revealing 
reality show after another.  The World Wide Web is a site of exhibitionism 
and voyeurism.  Videos of everything are posted on the Web—childbirth, 
breast cancer surgery, professional events, and social events, like your 
granddad’s seventieth birthday.  Youtube is an amazing resource; but, some 
of its content are videos posted by people who think every forgettable 
moment of fun should be filmed, uploaded, and shared. 
My teenagers have iPhones that keep them connected to the world 
and accountable to family and friends.  They expect me always to have my 
smart phone close at hand, turned on, and fully charged.  They expect me to 
answer their text messages immediately—“But I texted you, Mom” and 
“Why didn’t you answer my text?!”  They are baffled and disappointed if I 
do not go along.  Today, a mom who does not text and video chat is worse 
than a mom who does not cook.  So, I oblige. 
But it is not just teenagers who have embraced the ethos of revelation.  
Earlier this year, I was visiting a museum with my brother.  He is fifty 
years old and a lawyer.  While we were in the museum, he took a minute to 
update his status on Facebook.  He let hundreds of “friends” and 
 
handful of folks” out of the more than 30 anonymous authors they sued and the case 
is over.  Terms of the deal were not disclosed. 
Id.  The plaintiffs were identified in this news account as Heide Iravani and Brittan Heller.  Id. 
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acquaintances know where he was and what he was doing.  Far from home, 
he used the popular social networking application, Foursquare, to figure out 
if anyone he knew might be in the museum too.  If you think, “Well, of 
course he did,” then you have embraced and normalized the ethos I am 
problematizing. 
In the age of revelation many of us make disclosures about other 
people and feel ethically fine about it.  In the age of revelation, there is an 
emerging bias towards “nothing-is-sacred” disclosure, toward knowing, 
and toward finding out.  The WikiLeaks diplomatic cable disclosure was 
illustrative.  WikiLeaks took the concept of “government watchdog” to a 
whole new level. 
A case involving nursing students who posted images of themselves 
on Facebook raises an interesting set of questions about whether voluntary 
self-disclosures offend personal or professional ethics.22  Doyle Byrnes was 
a nursing student at Johnson County Community College.  In 2010, she 
was expelled from nursing school for what college administrators viewed 
as inappropriate conduct on Facebook.  Byrnes apologized for her conduct 
but felt expulsion was not called for.  So, she sued to get back into school.  
The Kansas federal district court judge that heard her case sided with her.  
On January 19, 2011, Judge Eric Melgren issued a preliminary injunction 
ordering not only that Byrnes be reinstated, but also that she be allowed to 
make up missed assignments and exams.23 
What had Byrnes done to get herself expelled in the first place?  On 
November 10, 2010, she participated in a clinical course on obstetrics and 
gynecology at Olathe Medical Center in Olathe, Kansas.  As part of the 
course she examined fresh placenta from recently delivered pregnancies.  
Byrnes and three other nursing students (witnesses Chrystie North, Jamie 
Vande Brake, and Danielle Thompson) wanted to photograph themselves 
examining the placenta to post on Facebook.  They obtained permission 
from the course supervisor, Defendant Amber Delphia, to photograph 
themselves examining a placenta specimen derived from a recent birth.  
Permission was granted on the condition that no identifying marks be 
present in the photograph. 
It was not until after class that Delphia asked the students what they 
intended to do with the photographs.  One of the women responded that 
they were going to post them on Facebook, to which they said Delphia 
replied, “Oh, you girls.”  When it came to the attention of the college that 
 
 22. Byrnes v. Johnson Cnty Comm. Coll., Civ. Action No. 10-2690-EFM-DJW, 2011 WL 
166715 (Dist. Kan. Jan, 19, 2011). 
 23. Id. at *5. 
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photographs of the nursing students with placenta were posted on 
Facebook, the girls were expelled. 
The judge enjoined Byrnes’ expulsion for several reasons.  First, he 
noted that the conduct in question may have been inappropriate or 
offensive to the nursing college, but it did not violate any clear policy or 
disciplinary rule.  Second, since photographs are meant to be shared, 
granting permission to photograph was in effect granting permission to 
share—face-to-face, on Facebook, or anywhere presumably.  Moreover, by 
only saying, “Oh, you girls,” as was alleged, Delphia missed an opportunity 
to object on school policy, legal, or ethical grounds to posting images with 
placenta and instead gave the students the impression that it would be 
alright to post. 
The judge did not buy the arguments that someone might be able to 
figure out the identity of the patient, from whom the placenta was donated, 
from information about the day and time of the picture.  This is not a case 
of likely re-identification.  So, the ethical failing is not so much a breach of 
patient confidentiality or invasion of patient privacy, but rather, it is a lack 
of professional dignity and respect for patients that is of concern. 
We are curious, inquisitive, and accountable.  It is perhaps because I 
have children about the same age as those involved in the Rutgers tragedy 
that I can so easily understand Dharun Ravi’s point of view.  At the time, 
Ravi did not think that he was doing anything seriously wrong when he 
activated a webcam to spy on his roommate Clementi.  After all, it was 
Ravi’s dorm room, too; webcams exist and everyone knows it; the camera 
only revealed what was true; he was really “making out” with another 
dude; and it is his own fault if he gets pranked. 
Clearly, there has been a shift in ethos, invisible to youth who have 
known no other way to live and discernable to anyone who was already an 
adult in the 1980s.  A shift in ethos is not necessarily a problem for ethics.  
But let us consider whether this one is a problem for ethics. One can readily 
comprehend the ethical concerns raised by WikiLeaks and cyber-bullying.  
However, the privacy-related ethical concerns raised by voluntary self-
disclosure are not as readily comprehended.  I believe there are reasons to 
think that you may be doing something unethical when you are just 
revealing facts about yourself to others.  But I have to go back in time 200 
years, or even 2000 years, to explain them. 
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V.  WHY KEEP YOUR MOUTH SHUT 
Consider the entry in John Adams’ diary dated Monday, August 20, 
1770.24  Adams was a patriot of the American Revolution and an eventual 
United States President.  In Adams’ view, privacies of concealment, 
secrecy, and reserve are both moral virtues and moral duties.  Worldly 
wisdom dictates that we protect ourselves from “damage, danger, and 
confusion” by generally keeping “our sentiments, actions, desires, and 
resolutions” to ourselves.  Revelations to enemies and indiscreet friends 
alike risk “loss, disgrace, or mortification.”  On occasion, though, virtue 
and duty run in the other direction: “the cause of religion, of government, 
of liberty, the interest of the present age and of posterity, render it a 
necessary duty for a man to make known his sentiments and intentions 
boldly and publicly.”25 
Adams’ take is modern.  Privacy aligns, not with raw preference, but 
with prudent self-interest.  The good of privacy is contingent.  Sometimes 
we ought to go public when we might prefer to hide; sometimes we ought 
to hide when we might prefer to go public.  The important thing is that 
privacy, like information sharing, has a place in free society.  Our moral 
interests include freedom from judgment, freedom to don masks, freedom 
to build and maintain reputations, and freedom to and from intimacy.26  
What must we hide?  Adams’ diary points to a general answer: hide the 
things where disclosure would lead to danger, disgrace, and dishonor. 
But a distinctly different rationale for self-concealment is suggested 
by the book of Matthew in the New Testament of the Christian Bible.  We 
should hide the things where disclosure leads to approval and admiration.  
The righteousness of pious acts such as giving to the poor, praying, and 
fasting is undermined by intentionally seeking public notice.  Through 
modesty and reserve we are taking God alone into confidence.  Thus: 
[Concerning Almsgiving] 
So whenever you give alms, do not sound a trumpet before you, as the 
hypocrites do . . . . But when you give alms, do not let your left hand 
know what your right hand is doing, so that your alms may be done in 
secret; and your Father who sees in secret will reward you.27 
 
 24. See ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? 195 (2011) 
(discussing Adams’ diary entry). 
 25. Diary Entry by John Adams (Aug. 20, 1770), in JOHN ADAMS DIARY, PAPER BOOK NO. 
15 Vol. 3 (1961), available at  http://www.masshist.org/digitaladams/aea/cfm/doc.cfm?id=D15. 
 26. Anita L. Allen, Driven into Society: Philosophies of Surveillance Take to the Streets of 
New York, 1 AMSTERDAM L.F. 4 (2009), available at http://ojs.ubvu.vu.nl/alf/ rticle/view/92/166. 
 27. Matthew 6:2–12 (New Revised Standard). 
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[Concerning Prayer] 
[A]nd whenever you pray, do not be like the hypocrites; for they love 
to stand and pray . . . at the street corners, so that they may be seen by 
others. . . . they have received their reward.  But whenever you pray, go 
into your room and shut the door and pray to your Father who is in 
secret; and your Father who sees in secret will reward you.28 
[Concerning Fasting] 
And when you fast, do not look dismal, like the hypocrites . . . . But 
when you fast, anoint your head and wash your face, that your fasting 
may be seen not by men but by your Father who is in secret; and your 
Father who sees in secret will reward you. 29 
There is a ready secular rendering of the message in this passage.  
Keeping your goodness to yourself makes you really good.  Virtue is its 
own reward.  Do not be a show off.  Ancient and early American texts offer 
a way of thinking about privacy that the buzz of continuous networking 
threatens to drown out.  Status updating on Facebook and Twitter risks 
offending the ethics of Adams and the ethics of Matthew.  The status 
update such as “I am giving a lecture in Paris” reads like a brag; and it is 
also an “all clear” message to house thieves and rivals in romance. 
VI.  PRIVACY LAW 
Does anyone care about all data giveaways and data collection that 
have come to characterize daily life?  Is there anything to be done about it?  
I believe there are moral duties of privacy—duties to ourselves and duties 
to others.  I believe there are also moral rights of privacy. 
The right to privacy means it is wrong to do what Rutgers freshman 
Ravi did to his roommate Clementi.  The moral right to privacy may mean 
that Maynard should not have published Salinger’s letters to her during his 
lifetime.  As it happens, the law sided with Maynard, but not with Ravi. 
Americans have a legal right to privacy.  It is enshrined in the United 
States Constitution, our common law, and in acts of Congress.  For the 
right to privacy, all Americans owe a debt of gratitude to United States 
Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis, who was a key architect of the 
American right to privacy. 
In law school at Harvard, Justice Brandeis formed a friendship with 
classmate Samuel D. Warren.  Together they founded a successful law 
partnership.  They remained close even after Warren—a wealthy, upper 
 
 28. Matthew 6:1–6 (New Revised Standard). 
 29. Matthew 6:16–23 (New Revised Standard). 
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crust Bostonian, married to a snobby anti-semetic senator’s daughter—was 
called away from the bar to take over his family’s business.  Warren was 
annoyed by all the attention the popular tabloid press paid to his 
extravagant life.  So he convinced the brilliant Justice Brandeis to write an 
article, to be published under both of their names, calling for the creation of 
a new legal right against so-called “yellow journalism.”  Their article, 
simply titled, “The Right to Privacy,” was published in the Harvard Law 
Review in the winter of 1890.30 
The right to privacy that Warren and Justice Brandeis conceived 
would deter and redress publication in newspapers of gossip and 
photographs that “invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic 
life” and thereby injured “inviolate personality.”  A rhetorical tour de force, 
the article inspired the bar and the judiciary.  Today, you may very well be 
entitled to a lawsuit to recover for your hurt feelings and lost dignity if, in a 
highly offensive manner, someone intrudes into your seclusion, publishes 
embarrassing private facts, places you in a false light, or uses your name or 
photo without your consent.  In this way, Ravi clearly violated Clementi’s 
common law privacy rights to have his intimate sex life kept secret. 
Justice Brandeis was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1916 
and remained there until 1939.  During his tenure, Justice Brandeis did for 
constitutional law what “attorney” Brandeis had done for personal injury 
law.  As a Supreme Court Justice, he laid the groundwork for a rich, 
express jurisprudence of privacy, starting with his famous dissent in a 
Fourth Amendment wiretapping case.  In Olmstead v. United States,31 
Justice Brandeis described the right to be let alone as “the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”  
Today, the right to privacy is well understood as a constitutional value in 
interpretations of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
The right to privacy is also recognized by federal statutes, for 
example: the Privacy Act of 1974,32 the Family Education and Right to 
Privacy Act,33 and the Electronic Communications Privacy Protection 
Act,34 which protects phone calls, email, and some web traffic.  The 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act is a remarkable statute because it 
 
 30. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
 31. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 32. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2010). 
 33. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2010). 
 34. Electronic Communications Privacy Protection Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 
(2002). 
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actually limits the ability of one class of Americans, children under 
thirteen, to engage in acts of voluntary self-disclosure.35  Website operators 
are not permitted to collect or retain childrens’ personal data. 
VII. PRIVACY ETHICS 
The law can only do so much.  An ethic of privacy is needed to 
complement (dare I say, counteract?) the ethos of revelation.  Such an ethic 
would include the general rule that “felt immorality does not automatically 
warrant denying someone informational privacy.” 
Consider the facts of a recent lawsuit, Yath v. Fairview Clinic.36  
Candace Yath brought the suit against a medical facility and members of 
her family.  A member of Yath’s husband’s extended family happened to 
work at a clinic where she was tested for sexually transmitted diseases, and 
saw Yath at the clinic.  The curious relative accessed Yath’s electronic 
medical record and then told another family member, resulting in someone 
setting up an insulting MySpace page.  The offensive page depicted Yath as 
a dirty adulteress: “Rotten Candy.”  Was this a bald exercise of free 
speech?  Yes.  Was this a bald invasion of privacy and breach of medical 
confidentiality?  Yes, too. 
In the era of revelation, we need an ethic that includes a general rule 
against needlessly sacrificing privacy in the name of protecting speech, 
and, by the way, property.  A striking example of the latter is the webcam 
scandal that rocked the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania suburb of Lower 
Merion in 2009.  On November 11, 2009, Lindy Matsko, an Assistant 
Principal at Harriton High School (“HHS”), approached fifteen-year-old 
Blake Robbins, then a sophomore, and informed him that school 
administrators believed that he was “engaged in improper behavior in his 
home.”37  Matsko cited as evidence an image taken from the webcam of 
Robbins’ school-issued MacIntosh laptop computer.38  Matsko believed the 
images captured implicated Robbins in illegal drug usage.39  Robbins, 
however, claimed at one television interview that the images showed him 
 
 35. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (1998). 
 36. Yath v. Fairview Clinics, 767 N.W.2d 34, 38 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009). 
 37. Class Action Complaint at 6, Robbins v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 10-cv-00665-JD 
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2010) [hereinafter Robbins Complaint]. 
 38. Ballard Spahr LLP, Report of Independent Investigation Regarding the Monitoring of 
Student Laptop Computers by the Lower Merion School District (May 3, 2010), 
http://lmsd.org/documents/news/100503_ballard_spahr_report.pdf. 
 39. Vince Lattanzio, WebcamGate Teen: “I Hope They’re Not Watching Me,” 
NBCPHILADELPHIA.COM, http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/tech/WebcamGate-Teen-I-
Hope-Theyre-Not-Watching-Me-84826357.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2010) [hereinafter NBC 
Philadelphia, Blake Robbins Interview]. 
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consuming Mike & Ike candy, which school administrators only mistook 
for drugs.40  Prior to this incident, neither Robbins’ parents nor any other 
high school parent or student in the Lower Merion School District were 
aware of the School District’s ability to capture screenshots and webcam 
images from the student’s school-issued laptops using so-called “Theft 
Track” software.  But the school could capture webcam shots “of anyone or 
anything appearing in front of the camera at the time of activation” taken 
from “any location in which the [school-issued] computer was kept,” 
including the student’s home.41 
In a statement to a newspaper after Robbins filed a lawsuit claiming 
privacy intrusions prohibited by state and federal law, a school district 
official, Connie DiMedio, confirmed that the School District did not 
disclose the Theft Track remote activation feature to teachers or students 
“for obvious reasons” since “[i]t involved computer security, and that is all 
it was being used for.”42  On October 11, 2010, the Lower Merion School 
Board voted unanimously to settle Robbins’ and another invasion of 
privacy lawsuit that resulted from its webcam spying for a total of 
$610,000.  The school agreed never again to use tracking software on 
student-issued laptops without the consent of students and their parents.43 
How can a society enthralled by technology-aided revelatory 
communication give privacy its ethical due?  The question is imperative as 
social media and social networking continue to take flight, as cloud 
computing becomes the norm for storing our documents and mementos, 
and as advances in genomics and neuroimaging create volumes of 
biomedical data which potentially reveal us to ourselves and others as 
never before. 
To ask the questions I am raising is not to deny that there is value in 
freedom of speech, sociality, and community.  I have noted in one of my 
papers44 that “[t]he 17th century British philosopher John Locke began 
 
 40. Jeff Schreiber, Two Mike & Ikes and One Motion, AMERICASRIGHTS.COM, 
http://americasright.com/?p=3237 (last visited April 5, 2010); see also NBC Philadelphia, Blake 
Robbins Interview, supra note 39. 
 41. Robbins Complaint, supra note 37, at 6, 7. 
 42. Dan Hardy & Bonnie Clark, Student Claims School Spied on Him Via Computer 
Webcam, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 19, 2010, at A01. 
 43. John P. Martin, “Lower Merion District’s Laptop Saga Ends with $610,000 Settlement,” 
PHILA. INQUIRER, (Oct. 12, 2010),  available at http://www.philly.com/philly/news/ 
0101012_Lower_Merion_district_s_laptop_saga_ends_with__610_000_settlement.html; 
Settlement Order filed October 15, 2010 at 1–2, Robbins. v. Lower Merion School District, No. 
10-cv-00665-JD (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2010). 
 44. Allen, supra note 26, at 35. 
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Chapter VII of the Second Treatise on Government45 with an intriguing 
notion of human solitude.  We are not meant to live alone.”  To the 
contrary, 
“[G]od having made man such a creature, that in his own judgment, it 
was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong obligations of 
necessity, convenience, and inclination, to drive him into society, as 
well as fitted him with understanding and language to continue and 
enjoy it.”46 
Locke did not go so far though as to expressly endorse a social 
contract, which leaves us “utterly exposed, transparent, [and] accountable 
to the individuals and institutions of which civil society is constituted.”47  
Indeed, 
the first U.S. state court to recogni[z]e a common law right to privacy 
(the Georgia Supreme Court, in Pavesich v[.] New England Life 
Insurance Company in 1905)48 appealed to a Lockean notion of the 
social contract and the laws of nature, arguing that freedom to choose 
seclusion from the watchful eye of society is a natural right we enter 
the social contract to secure.  If we are to be watched and made public, 
it must be by our free choice that we are watched and made public.49 
The eighteenth-century French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau’s 
fabled account of the emergence of civil society from a state of nature 
emphasized the primacy of aloneness and privacy.  According to Rousseau, 
the original human inclination was to dwell mostly alone.  In part one of 
the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Rousseau describes natural man 
and woman in a “natural state as . . . solitary, unselfconscious animal[s], 
[each] ‘a free being, whose heart is at ease and whose body is in health.’”50  
The crowding of the earth led to neighborhoods of hut dwellers.  
“Eventually: ‘in consequence of seeing each other often, they could not do 
without seeing each other constantly.’”51  The community obliterated 
solitude and in its place developed “[i]ntimacy, language, culture, and 
morality.”52  The lack of solitude spawned the need for privacy.  The 
community lifestyle created the inner need for sanctuary, secrecy, and 
control.  But the quest for privacy–for reputation, for repose from continual 
 
 45. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (1690), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/jl/2ndtr07.htm. 
 46. Id. at § 77. 
 47. Allen, supra note 26, at 35. 
 48. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 69 L.R.A. 101 (Ga. 1905). 
 49. Allen, supra note 26, at 35. 
 50. Id. at 36. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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judgment, and esteem–can get out of hand when coupled with a desire for 
accumulating property or power over others.  As the primitive civilization 
Rousseau imagined matured, infected with amour-propre it “became the 
interest of men to appear what they really were not.”  To conceal secret 
jealousy, ambition, and competition, humankind put on “the mask of 
benevolence.”53 
Privacy can be a “Machivellian,” even antisocial, asset-enabling 
immorality, “manipulation, seduction, assassination, and coup.”  But it 
does not have to be.  It can be a bit of sanctuary from judgment and for 
repose, as Rousseau suggests.  Privacy can be of a piece with Adamsonian, 
Aristotelian, and Christian virtue: prudence, modesty, humility, and 
reserve. 
VIII. INDIFFERENCE TO PRIVACY 
Without a doubt, in the era of revelation, some of us are indifferent to 
our own privacy.  We may be unwisely indifferent to our own privacy 
because we are young, or because we are busy, or because we are 
unfamiliar with the risks of data collection, sharing, and storage that come 
with the mysterious technology we enjoy.  In March 2011, the European 
Union announced that it would seek measures to require social networking 
sites to take down and destroy pages.  In the era of revelation, we are 
beginning to see that we can be harmed by the habit of self-disclosure.  
There must be a right to forget and be forgotten. 
There are things we must hide.  We must hide what is necessary to 
preserve our common dignity and separate virtues.54  We must hide what is 
necessary to keep ourselves safe from harm.  We must hide what our roles 
and responsibilities and professions dictate that we hide as matters of 
efficacy, beneficence, or contract; and we must hide, notwithstanding all of 
technology’s attractions, what good relationships and reputations—now 
and in our distant and uncertain futures—renders it prudent to hide.  Telling 
us exactly what and why we hide—this is the work of a comprehensive 
ethic of privacy in an era of revelation.55 
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